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A seller seeking to sell an indivisible object can post (possibly different) prices to each of n
buyers. Buyers' valuations are private information and drawn independently from the same
distribution. If the seller can choose who to sell to in the event there are several willing
buyers, her optimal strategy is to post different prices to different buyers. For some
distributions, price discrimination may be profitable even if excess demand must be resolved
through a uniform lottery.
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A person is trying to sell a piece of antique furniture by placing classi￿ed ads in ￿ve di￿erent
newspapers. Assume the readership of these newspapers are disjoint but have similar income
and taste pro￿les. Should the owner ask for the same price in all ￿ve ads, or should she
quote ￿ve di￿erent asking prices (price discrimination)?
This note shows that in many plausible scenarios, the seller’s optimal policy is to price
discriminate. If she can wait long enough to gather all responses and choose the highest
advertised price that received a positive response, it is always pro￿table to set di￿erent prices
rather than a uniform price. If she must choose the ￿rst positive response that comes her
way, it may still be pro￿table to depart from a uniform price depending on the distribution
of buyers’ values.
Standard theories of price discrimination hinge on either observable heterogeneity among
buyers or self selection mechanisms that reveal buyer types. The latter is achieved by making
the price conditional on factors whose e￿ect on buyers depends on their willingness to pay.
For example, intertemporal price discrimination (Stokey (1979)) exploits the fact that high
valuation buyers su￿er bigger delay costs, quantity discounts utilize di￿erential marginal
utility of high and low valuation buyers (Maskin and Riley (1984)), price variation across
outlets relies on less price sensitive buyers having higher search costs (Salop (1977)) and
mixed bundling sorts consumers by preference (Adams and Yellen (1976)).1 In all these
cases, price discrimination rides on some method of extracting information, and there is
positive correlation between the price a consumer pays and her utility from consuming the
good.
In contrast, price discrimination arises here as a way of maximizing seller’s return through
a diversi￿ed portfolio of options. By asking for a high price from some customers, the seller
takes a high risk, high payo￿ gamble. By setting a low asking price for others, she creates a
low risk fallback option in case the risky gamble doesn’t pay o￿. Not only are observationally
identical agents treated di￿erently, there is no correlation between the price they face and
1For a fuller discussion of various kinds of price discriminaion, see Tirole (1988). There is also a large
literature on price dispersion, but these papers focus not on monopolies but competitive markets with search
friction (see for example, Salop and Stiglitz (1977) and Burdett and Judd (1983)).
1their private value.
A critical assumption behind these results is that sellers are capacity constrained and the
good is indivisible. This means various buyers are substitutes from the seller’s perspective,
as in an auction. With unlimited capacity as in standard models, the interaction with each
buyer works like a separate monopoly problem and price discrimination cannot arise if buyers
are ex ante identical.
2 The Model
A seller wants to sell an indivisible object. Its value to herself for personal use is normalized
to 0. There are n potential buyers, indexed 1;2;:::;n. Buyer i’s private value of the object
is xi, which is a random variable drawn from a distribution with a density function f(:) on
the domain [x;x] and corresponding c.d.f F(:). Buyer’s values are independent and private
information.2
It is well known that ￿rst or second price auctions with appropriate reserve prices con-
stitute an optimum (revenue maximizing) mechanism in this simple environment (Myerson
(1979)). Auctions do better than a single posted price because they exploit the private
information of interested buyers. However, auctions also present some coordination and
credibilty issues which may make them di￿cult to administer in many practical situations.
For example, buyers may be su￿ciently separated in space and time to bring them together
in a single auction. In some formats like the second price auction, the seller has an incentive
to misrepresent the bids of others to the winner. Without going very deeply into why the
set of feasible mechanisms may be restricted, I will focus on a particularly simple and com-
monly observed selling mechanism|posted prices. However, instead of con￿ning ourselves
to a single posted price, I allow the seller to price discriminate, i.e., post possibly di￿erent
prices to di￿erent buyers or sub-markets. The question of interest is whether it may be
pro￿table to exercise such price discrimination even if buyers are ex ante identical.
Suppose the seller can post a price pi to the ith buyer. Each pi is interpreted as a
2An alternative interpretation is that these are n separate sub-markets, as opposed to individuals, in
which case the random variable xi is to be interpreted as the highest willingness to pay among all customers
in sub-market i.
2contingent price|it is the price i has to pay only if he receives the good.3 Buyers can
respond with a yes or no, where ‘yes’ implies an agreement to buy the good at the posted
price if it is made available. To complete the description, we need to specify how the good
gets allocated in the event of excess demand. I will explore two scenarios: (i) seller discretion:
among the willing buyers, the seller can choose who should get the good (ii) lottery: one of
the willing buyers is chosen at random through a uniform lottery.
2.1 Seller Discretion
In this case, the solution to the problem of posting prices (simultaneously) is the same as
that to a related sequential pricing problem which is described below.
Suppose buyers arrive sequentially (in the sequence 1;2;:::;n). To buyer i, the seller can
make a take-it-or-leave-it o￿er at some price pi, which this buyer can either accept or reject.
If he accepts, the transaction is carried out and the game ends. If he rejects, the seller moves
on to the next buyer. If none of the buyers agree to their respective prices, the good is not
sold and the seller’s payo￿ is zero.
Buyers’ optimal strategies being very simple (says ‘yes’ if and only if the posted price
is less than his value), the problem reduces to a simple dynamic programming problem for
the seller. Her feasible plans are price sequences fpign
i=1. The ex ante optimal plan fp￿
ign
i=1
















F(pj) is de￿ned to be 1 for i = 1. The sale takes place at price pi if all buyers
j, with j < i, decline to buy at the prices posted to them, but i accepts. The probability
of this event is
i￿1 Y
j=1
F(pj):[1 ￿ F(pi)]. The objective function is the average of the posted
prices, weighted by their respective probabilities of materializing as the transaction price.
Lemma 1 The ex ante optimal plan is time consistent.
3The posted prices may be thought of as price o￿ers that are \valid till stocks last".
3Proof. Suppose not. Then, for some k, after the ￿rst k buyers decline, the seller will ￿nd
it pro￿table to deviate from the price sequence fp￿
ign
i=1 and o￿er an alternative subsequence
fp0
ign

































































which contradicts the fact that fp￿
ign
i=1 is ex ante optimal.
Time consisency of the seller’s optimal plan in the sequential problem allows us to ￿nd
it using dynamic programming techniques. Let vi denote the value function when the ￿rst i






[1 ￿ F(pi)]pi + F(pi)vi+1 (2)
and the value functions satisfy the recursive relation







Lemma 2 Suppose for all vi+1 2 [x;x], p￿
i as de￿ned by (2) is unique.4 Then the optimal
price sequence is strictly decreasing, i.e., p￿
1 > p￿
2 > ::: > p￿
n.
Proof. First, observe that since each value function is an expected transaction price, it must
lie in the interior of the domain of buyers’ values, i.e., x < vi < x. Further, the sequence of
value functions is strictly decreasing: for all i, vi > vi+1. This is because on examining the
4If f(:) is di￿erentiable, a su￿cient condition for uniqueness is that the hazard rate
f(:)
1￿F(:) is increasing.
The ￿rst order condition for the maximization problem in (2) is: pi ￿
1￿F(pi)
f(pi) = vi+1. With increasing
hazard rate, the left hand side is monotone increasing in pi, while the right hand side is a constant, implying
a unique solution.
4objective function of the ith period problem (right hand side of (2)), it becomes clear that
vi > vi+1 can be guaranteed by choosing any price pi 2 (vi+1;x).
For all i, since vi 6= vi+1, unique optimality of p￿
i and p￿











































(vi ￿ vi+1) > 0





The intuition behind Lemma 2 is straightforward. When there are still many buyers to
come, the option value of continuing search is high and rejection is not very costly. Hence
the seller will set a high price. When she is down to the last few buyers, the reasoning is
reversed and the seller faces a steep trade-o￿ between price and probability of sale. She will,
consequently, lower the price.
Finally, note that the simultaneous price posting problem described originally has es-
sentially the same solution (except for permutations) as the sequential price posting game
characterized above, i.e., fp￿
ign
i=1 is also the solution to the former. To see this, consider
simultaneous price posting and without loss of generality, impose the following ordering:
p1 ￿ p2 ￿ ::: ￿ pn. Given seller’s discretion, she will choose to sell at the highest price which
receives a positive response. Her objective function, then, is the same as (1), the ex ante
payo￿ in the sequential pricing problem, with the added constraint that p1 ￿ p2 ￿ ::: ￿ pn.
Since the ex ante optimal plan of the sequential problem satis￿es the constraint (Lemma 2),
it is also the solution to the simultaneous pricing problem.
Proposition 1 In the simultaneous price posting problem, if excess demand is resolved
through seller’s discretion and p￿
i as de￿ned by (2) is unique, the optimal prices are dis-
tinct from one another.
Proof. Follows straight from the preceding discussion and Lemma 2.
52.2 Random Allocation
An alternative way of modeling the price posting problem would depart from the previous
framework in how excess demand is handled. Here I will consider a scenario in which one of
the willing buyers is chosen at random by a uniform lottery rather than by seller’s discretion.
This is a parsimonious way of capturing the following situation|after the seller has posted
all her prices, responses arrive stochastically over time and the seller may be compelled by
legal, institutional or self interest reasons to serve the ￿rst buyer to express interest.
In such situations, whether optimal pricing is uniform or discriminatory depends on the
distribution of buyers’ types. To illustrate this, I will consider a simpler discrete model with
two buyers, 1 and 2. Each buyer could have a high value xH, with probability q, or a low
value xL, with probability 1 ￿ q. Buyers’ types are independent. The seller simultaneously
posts prices p1 and p2 to the two buyers, and if both respond ‘yes’, the good is allocated by
the toss of a fair coin and the recipient pays the price that was posted to him. Let ￿(p1;p2)
denote the expected pro￿t from the posted price pair (p1;p2) under these rules.
Assume buyers always want to buy when indi￿erent. The seller’s optimum must be one
of three pricing strategies: (i) uniformly low pricing (p1 = p2 = xL) (ii) uniformly high
pricing (p1 = p2 = xH) (iii) discriminatory pricing (p1 = xH;p2 = xL). The next result
shows discriminatory pricing is optimum in some but not all situations.
Proposition 2 In the simultaneous price posting problem, if excess demand is resolved
through an uniform lottery, optimal prices are discriminatory (p￿
1 = xH;p￿





(1 ￿ q)(1 + 2q)
1 + q
(4)
Proof. The expected payo￿s from the three candidate strategies are as follows:
￿(xL;xL) = xL (5)





(1 ￿ q)(xH + xL) + qxL (7)
When both prices are low, a sale is guaranteed. When both prices are high, the probability
that at least one buyer will accept is 1 ￿ q2. With the discriminatory (high-low) pricing
6strategy, the buyer facing the low price is always willing to buy. If the buyer facing the high
price is also willing to buy (probability 1 ￿ q), the expected price the seller will receive is
the average, 1
2(xH + xL). Otherwise, she receives the low price, xL.
Discriminatory pricing is optimum when the expression in (7) dominates both (5) and
(6). It is easily checked that the ￿rst is always true, while (7) dominates (6) if and only if
(4) is satis￿ed.
The set of parameters satisfying (4) is of positive measure, since for any q 2 (0;1), the
right hand side of (4) also lies between 0 and 1. The condition places a lower bound on xL
relative to xH, because if xL is too low, it is worth taking a gamble with both customers
instead of securing a \bottomline" by keeping one price low and gambling with the other.
3 Conclusion
The literature on price discrimination emphasizes consumer heterogeneity, either directly
observed or revealed through a menu of contracts and buyer self selection. This note raises
another possibility|sellers’ desire to diversify their portfolio of selling options. The e￿ect
is extremely robust when the environment allows a seller to wait and choose from the set of
willing buyers. It may also arise when this selection is e￿ectively random, but depends on
the distribution of buyers’ private values in that case.
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